Data Exhaust: Romney's Life is in Danger

While only one passing mention of cyber security came up in last night's presidential debate (Romney mentioned Chinese cyber attacks in a compound sentence), my handy-dandy Quantum Leap Buzz social media analytics notification came alive with Obama supporters actually making threats on Romney's life. I'm rather surprised the news hasn't covered this. Then again, social media analytics is constantly putting me onto trending stories that NEVER make mainstream media newscasts. Below is my "buzz furball" for the "kill Romney" movement.

Hopefully SOMEBODY in the Secret Service candidate protection detail is paying attention. I now return to my regularly scheduled Cyber Privateer dialogue.

Cybercrime & Tonight's Presidential Debate

In February 2011, I opined (see it here) that cybercrime was indeed an easy-entry career. Given today's Computerworld story (read it here) how cyberthieves looted $400,000 from a Bank of America client, it appears that it's also a lucrative career. Especially when current cybercrime law in the U.S. forces us to play only defense. Yes, it's too much to hope that either presidential candidate gets the big picture, here. Which is too bad. Selah.

DOD finalizing offensive "rules of engagement"

The final paragraph of today's New York Times story (read it here) is the only element of hope on the horizon of an otherwise bleak future.

The Defense Department is finalizing “rules of engagement” that would put the Pentagon’s cyberweapons into play only in case of an attack on American targets that rose to some still unspecified but significant levels. Short of that, the Pentagon shares intelligence and offers technical assistance to the F.B.I. and other agencies.

Unfortunately, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has the same set of blinders as every other administration and legislator has worn. Namely, he just assumes that the only way to deal with cyber threats is to line the pockets of "Beltway Bandits" and insist that the government should be the only source of offensive cyber capability. And that is the reason why blocking the latest cyber security bill makes sense.

The "rules of engagement" should be…you guessed it…The Morgan Doctrine and rigid adherence to my Cyber Privateer Code (read it here). Otherwise, we really will have what Panetta calls a cyber equivalent of a Pearl Harbor from which we will not easily recover. Right now, we're guaranteed to lose because we're playing the game with our hands tied behind our backs.

Too bad this subject won't come up in the presidential debates.

Who has "Black Box Virus Portability?"

Today's New York Times article—Cyberwarfare Emerges From Shadows for Public Discussion by U.S. Officials (read it here)—seems to have done a credible job summarizing a growing public discussion about government involvement in cyberwarfare. The problem however, is the underlying assumption that only government-level resources are fit to play this game. From the only intelligent individual quoted in the article:

Matthew Waxman, a law professor at Columbia and former Defense Department official, said speaking openly about cyberwarfare policy was important because it allowed the United States to make clear its intentions on a novel and fast-emerging form of conflict.

Professor Waxman essentially makes my point about a publicly stated "DOCTRINE" for cyberwar. Unfortunatey, in the context of the current governments-only mindset, this translates to playing with our hands tied behind our backs. Whereas licensed and bonded cyber privateers operating under strict government authority would be the only viable answer.

Which brings me to my question of the day: Who has "Black Box Virus Portability?" As I have stated in my 22 Principles for the Perfect Virus (see here),  the HOLY GRAIL of the Perfect Virus is Principle #7 (see here, upon which I articulated almost two years ago), BLACK BOX PORTABILITY. Because it DEFINITELY DOES take government-level resources to build an alien architecture that's immune to "grokking" by technology that assumes it knows what it is going up against). So my budding cyber privateers, does anyone have black box portability?

My answer: "No government has it." To be sure, at least two governments probably DO HAVE black box architectures engineered for Cyber Armageddon (the U.S. and China), but I don't believe they've cracked the Piers Anthony Macroscope code to infiltrating another black box. I also believe that they are "sniffing" for black boxes in the wild, because they'd be crazy not to. Finally, the odds are non-trivial that at least one private party HAS achieved black box virus portability. Further, I'm betting that this party is hiding in plain sight and (hopefully) has altruistic motives. Maybe like riding in on a big white cyberhorse and stopping the inevitable all-out cyberwar cold.

I know. I'm such an optimistic sucker.
 

NY Times Op-Ed on Cyberwar is Quite Humorous

I got quite a knee-slapper this morning from my Quantum Leap Buzz "data exhaust sniffer" (get your own by clicking here) when I got a message equating cyberwarfare with the nuclear arms race. A New York Times Op-Ed piece (see here) actually suggests the nuclear metaphor. My problem with that logic is that nuclear weapons development (as the Iranians are proving) is no small task. Compare that with cyberwarfare, where a single brilliant individual with a laptop, a power source, and a satellite phone can bring the world to its knees from a cave in some third-world country. The final quote from this contestant in the 2012 Intellectual Special Olympics gave me two laughs for the price of one:

Cyberwarfare is not to be entered into lightly, and governments need to be more open about their capabilities. Disclosure is imperative to prevent attacks that may cost lives and potentially snowball into major global conflicts.

Translated: "My little security firm in Finland is way behind the curve, and I'd sure like someone to tell us where all that cool stuff is coming from and who has a corner on the zero-day exploit market."